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Change and Continuity in the Recruitment 
of Italian Political Terrorists: 1970-1984 
LEONARD W EINB ERG AND WILLIAM L EE EUBANK 
University of Nevada-Reno 
(This is a revision of a paper presented at the Annual Conference of the 
American Political Science Association, New Orleans, August 
29-September 1, 1985) 
Understanding the growth of political terrorism has become a central 
concern expressed in the professional literature. Various techniques have 
been used to measure the spread of terrorist events both within and between 
nations. 1 As part of this endeavor analysts have drawn parallels between the 
spread of contagious diseases and outbreaks of terrorist activities. And 
naturally enough, given the way in which the situation has been defined, 
these analysts have sought to prescribe the most appropriate therapies with 
which to reduce or eliminate the infection. 
In view of the way in which the problem has been approached, it is 
somewhat surprising that more attention has not been focused on the 
bearers of the contagion: the terrorists themselves. This is not to say that 
observers of political terrorism have ignored the perpetrators: far from it. 
The literature abounds with excellent studies of the social and psychological 
characteristics of these individuals. 2 But these investigations, intended to 
produce a 'terrorist profile,• seem not to take into account the possibility 
that different sorts of people might be attracted to terrorism at different 
stages in the spread of the phenomenon. Do people from the same or similar 
backgrounds become involved in terrorist operations over the entire life-
span of a terrorist organization? Or, does the susceptibility vary among in-
dividuals the longer the outbreak is sustained? 
Given the enormous attention terrorist activities receive in the mass 
media, it seems reasonable to believe that individuals who join or form ter-
rorist groups after a terrorist episode has begun would confront a different 
situation than those who were responsible for its initiation. At a minimum, 
the circumstances would be altered by virtue of the fact that the latecomers 
would be aware of the various costs, risks and opportunities surrounding 
the decision to become the member of a terrorist band. But do changes in 
circumstances mean changes in the kinds of people who become terrorists? 
Of course, in any number of countries this question is rendered moot 
because the authorities succeed in isolating and repressing the terrorist 
organizations before they can recruit new members from outside the ranks 
of their founders . 
This has not been the case in Italy however. Among the industrialized 
democracies, Italy has experienced one of the most protracted national 
episodes of political terrorism. The episode is widely regarded as having 
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begun with the bombing of the National Agricultural Bank of Piazza Fon-
tana in Milan in December 1969 and not to have ended, or even subsided, 
until the wave of arrests that followed the release of American General 
James Dozier from his Red Brigades' kidnappers in 1982. At a reduced level 
of intensity, the terrorism continues to the present. 
In addition to its duration there are several other features of the Italian 
terrorist experience that are important to call to the reader's attention. 3 
First, as distinguished from the long-lived experiences of Northern Ireland 
and the Basque country of Spain, causes of a nationalist-separatist nature 
were not significant stimuli for the outbeak of terrorism. Instead, the 
sources in the Italian case appear to have been predominantly ideological, 
sources not rooted in the long-standing grievances of a particular ethnic or 
religious community; that is, groups whose members often may serve as 
constant pools from which terrorist bands may recruit new adherents. Sec-
ond, the ideologies that motivated Italian terrorists were not exclusively of 
leftist origin. In addition to groups animated by revolutionary communist 
objectives, variously defined, a substantial amount of the violence was the 
work of formations that derived their inspiration from Fascist or neo-
Fascist doctrines . 
Another characteristic of the Italian experience concerns the timing of 
the violence. There was an initial wave of terrorism beginning in 1969 and 
extending to 1976. By the middle of that year most members of the Red 
Brigades' 'historic nucleus' as well as most members of the Armed Pro-
letarian Nuclei and Partisan Action Groups, the other major leftist groups, 
had been arrested. Furthermore, the initial wave of violent neo-Fascist 
organizations, the New Order, National Vanguard, the National Front and 
others, had been dissolved by the authorities and many of their leaders, 
militants and sponsors had met the same fate as their leftist counterparts. In 
fact, it appeared as if the terrorist episode had come to an end. But this was 
not to be. Nineteen seventy-seven witnessed the reignition of terrorist 
violence. New groups on both the Left and Right arose to take the place of 
the old; in turn, these bands succeeded in recruiting large numbers of new 
adherents. Further, old groups, notably the Red Brigades, managed to at-
tract a largely new generation(s) of members. What then followed in the 
next several years was a dramatic escalation in the numbers of terrorist 
events throughout the country. The style of the violence was also somewhat 
different. Previously the leftist groups had carried out "exemplary actions" 
intended to bring their cause to the attention of the working class. In the 
new phase they began to wage revolutionary "campaigns" against the 
bourgeois system and to direct their efforts against "the heart of the state." 
The neo-Fascist groups also changed tactics and exhibited a willingness to 
attack selected representatives of government authority. Finally, the second 
spasm of terrorism differed from the initial one by virtue of the political 
coloration of those groups responsible for committing the bulk of it.• 
Measured in terms of direction, the first wave of violence was 
dominated by the neo-Fascists. It was they who were responsible for the ma-
jority of violent events, including the massacres at Piazza Fontana as well as 
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those in Brescia and on the express train Italicus both in 1974. The Red 
Brigades, on the other hand, did not kill their first victim until 1974. Despite 
the formation of new neo-Fascist groups (e.g., Third Position, Nuclei of 
Armed Revolutionaries) after the mid 1970's, it was the revolutionary com-
munist ones that dominated terrorist activities from 1977. There was, in 
short, a shift from Black to Red. 
II 
Bearing in mind the above account, the question we intend to address is 
this: In what ways, if any, did individuals who became involved in terrorist 
activities before 1977 differ from those whose careers in terrorism began in 
or followed that year? To answer this question biographical information 
was obtained concerning 2,512 individuals who were either arrested or for 
whom warrants were issued for having committed, planned or supported 
acts of political terrorism between 1970 and the first half of 1984. This in-
formation was derived from two national circulation newspapers, La Stam-
pa of Turin and La Repubblica of Rome, as well as court records (re-
quisitorie, ordinanzelsentenze and sentenze) from many though not all of 
the major terrorist trials.' The data file taken from these sources does not 
represent a sample, it is instead a reasonably extensive collection of the 
Italian terrorist population. The information collected about the terrorists 
included their gender, communities and regions of birth as well as those of 
adult residence. Aside from these characteristics, information was also 
recorded concerning their occupational backgrounds, family relationships 
and pre-terrorist political involvements. Finally, we noted in what year they 
were arrested/identified as terrorists, their ages at that time (and for reasons 
to be made clear later, their ages in 1969), the particular terrorist organiza-
tion with which they were affiliated and the roles they played inside the 
groups. 
However, the investigators cannot be certain but that either they or 
their sources failed to locate other individuals whose behavior would war-
rant inclusion. Further, the possibility exists that a number of individuals 
whose records appear in the file were, in fact, innocent of the crimes they 
were alleged to have committed . Last on our list of qualifications is the fact 
that the careers of some terrorists overlapped the two periods into which we 
have divided the episode. Some individuals may have begun their in-
volvements before 1977 but only came to the attention of the authorities 
during or after that year. In most cases, it was possible to correct for this 
problem based on the person's terrorist group affiliation. That is, if the per-
son was identified as a member of a group like the New Order of the Nuclei 
of Armed Proletarians, organizations whose operations were largely con-
fined to the first period, the individual was presumed to have begun his/her 
involvement at that time and assigned a position accordingly. Inevitably 
though some individuals escaped this procedure. But given the size of the 
data file, their impact on the overall analysis is not likely to be a very large 
one. 
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III 
For some observers, Italian terrorism is best understood as a by-
product of the "culture of 1968." 6 In 1968 and the "hot autumn" of 1969, 
Italy experienced a massive explosion of student protest and worker militan-
cy. The events of these years have been defined as an institutional crisis, 
with existing political, educational and trade union organizations proving 
unable to contain or channel the rapid mobilization of so many angry 
citizens. Radical extraparliamentary movements were organized by and for 
those students, workers and alienated individuals from various walks of life 
who found existing institutions to have fallen victim to something ap-
proaching the iron law oJ oligarchy. The events of 1968-69 have also been 
interpreted as a generational rebellion. The young, of neo-Fascist as well as 
leftist disposition, withdrew their support from or de-authorized a whole ar-
ray of institutions they perceived as having become dominated by geron-
tocratic leaderships. 
This institutional crisis or generational rebellion had profound conse-
quences on the development of political terrorism. One interpretation has it 
that some individuals, those who organized the Red Brigades' for example, 
initiated terrorist activities after brief transitional exposures to the extra-
parliamentary movements. For other future leftist terrorists the impact of 
1968-69 was delayed. After years of membership in extraparliamentary 
movements like Worker Power and Continuous Struggle, these individuals 
turned to terrorism after the collapse of the New Left in the 1976 national 
elections, elections which also resulted in a failure to remove the hated 
Christian Democratics from control of the national government. As the 
radicals saw it, years of struggle by the movements had come to nothing. 
The only way to unblock the Italian political system and achieve their 
revolutionary objectives was through use of political violence. The Com-
munist party, a likely alternative, was unable to integrate the revolu-
tionaries; in 1976 it was pursuing an historic compromise with the Christian 
Democrats, a policy of reformism and working class betrayal from their 
perspective. 
This commentary suggests an understanding of the terrorist 
phenomenon through what amounts to a "big bang" theory. The events of 
1968-69 were a formative experience for a generation of young Italians. The 
effects, immediate for some long-term for others, were to provide an im-
petus for involvement in terrorism. To become a terrorist one had to be 
touched directly by the events of 1968-69. 
Although this was no doubt true for some, in general the data do not 
support this interpretation (see Table 1). Of the 2,512 individuals in our ter-
rorist population, 46 per cent were under the age of 16 in 1969, and 18 per 
cent were less than 11 years old when the upheaval occurred. In other 
words, these were people too young to have taken a direct part in the tur-
bulent events of these years. 
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TA BLE I 
Age Distribution of Italian Terrorists in 1969 
Age Number of Terrorists (Per Cent) 
I 10 5 17 ( I) 
610 10 417 (17) 
11 10 15 732 (29) 
1610 20 556 (22) 
21 lO 25 295 (12) 
26 10 30 131 ( 5) 
31 10 35 56 ( 2) 
36 10 40 42 ( 2) 
41 lO 45 31 ( I ) 
46 10 50 16 ( I) 
SI and above 219 ( 9) 
N = 2,5 12 (100) 
Even if we confine the analysis to left-wing terrorists, the segment of 
the population really intended to be covered by this interpretation, the out-
come is not altered. In fact, the left-wing terrorists were actually younger in 
J 969 than were the neo-Fascists. Of the 1,763 leftists in the study, 853 (or 64 
per cent) were under 16. Furthermore, if 1968-69 was crucial in the making 
of terrori sts, we would expect that over time their ages would increase as 
they were apprehended or identified by the authorities . Yet this is not true 
either. The terrorists identified in 1977 and after were significantly younger 
than those whose involvements were reported during the first period. 
If participation in the events of 1968-69 was not an indispensable ingre-
dient in the decision to embark on a career as a terrorist, it would seem like-
ly that some process of cultural or ideological transmission was at work. If 
it was not the same individuals sharing the same experiences, then perhaps 
the post 1976 terrorists became susceptible to the contagion as the result of 
expo sure to the same social climate and institutional setting as gave rise to 
the first wave. 
We sought to deal with this issue by dividing our population into those 
individuals who were identified as terrorists before 1977 and those who 
received the designation in 1977 and after. The differences between the two 
groups are summarized in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
Differences Between Early (1970-1976) and 
Late (1977- 1984) Italian Terror ists 
Characteristic 2A: Sex 
Male Female 
449 50 
(23.8) ' (11.2) 
Late 1836 1441 395 
(76.2) (88.8) 
1890 445 
X' = 32.86 prob . :s .001 phi = .12 
• Percentages in parenthesis arc colu mn percents. 
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28 : Birthpla ce 
(region) 
Foreign 
North Center Rome South Born 
Early 156 50 37 58 5 306 
(31.0) (34.0) (16.7) (18.7) (11.9) 
Late 348 97 184 252 37 918 
(69.0) (66.0) (83.3) (81.3) (88. 1) 
504 147 221 310 42 1224 
X' = 34.31 prob . s .001 tau b = . 13 
2C: Birthplace 
(size of community) 
Foreign 
Small Medium Big City Born 
Early 86 109 119 5 319 
(19.5) (28.2) (24.0) (11.9) 
La1e 354 277 377 37 1054 
(80.5) (71.8) (76.0) (88.1) 
440 386 496 42 1364 
X' = 11.88 prob . s .001 tau b = -.02 
2D: Place of Residen ce 
(region) 
Foreign 
North Center Rome South Born 
Early 273 60 80 57 I 471 
(22.6)• (26.1) (14.0) (22.5) (33.3) 
Late 935 170 492 196 2 l79S 
(77.4) (73.9) (86.0) (77.5) (66.7) 
1208 230 S72 253 2266 
X' = 23. 15 prob . s .001 tau b = .047 
2E: Place of Residence 
(size of community) 
Foreign 
Small Medium Bis City Bom 
Early 52 136 285 I 474 
(21.7) (26.1) (18.9) (33.3) 
Late 188 386 1226 2 1802 
(78.3) (73.9) (81.1) (66.7) 
240 522 1226 2276 
X' = 12.57 prob . s .006 tau b = .058 
2F : Family Relationship to Other Terrorists 
Yes No 
Early 51 443 494 
(16.7) (21.9) 
Late 254 1582 1836 
(83.3) (78.1) 
305 2025 2330 
X' = 3.91 prob. s .04 phi = .043 
20 : Type of Family Relationship 
Marital Sibling Parental Other 
Early 16 26 5 4 51 
(11.8) ' (18.7) (41.7) (22.2) 
Late 120 113 7 14 254 
(88.2) (81.3) (S8.3) (77.8) 
136 139 12 18 305 
X' = 8.54 prob . s .036 tau b = -.132 
• Percentages in parenthesis arc column percents, 
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Early 
Lat< 
X' = 27.98 
Early 
Late 
prob . s .001 
Left 
30 
(30 .2) 
44 
(69.8) 
63 
2H : Prior Political Party Affiliation 
CcnLcr 
3 
(75.0) 
I 
(25.0) 
4 
21: Extraparliamentary Movement Affiliation 
Left Right 
39 149 
(II .4) (85.6) 
302 
(88.6) 
341 
25 
(14.4) 
174 
X' = 270,43 prob. :S .001 phi = .723 
2J : Age at Time of ldentificaLion 
IS to 19 20 to 24 25 to 29 30 to 34 35 10 39 40 10 44 
Early 27 ISO 117 62 31 24 (17.6)' (19 .7) (18.S) (18.7) (24.8) (41.4) 
Late 126 611 514 269 94 34 (82 .4) (80.3) (81.S) (81.3) (7S.2) (58.6) 
153 761 631 331 125 58 
X' = 134.56 prob . s .00 tau b = -. l02 
2K: Occupation 
Shop -
Right 
63 
(73.3) 
23 
(26.7) 
86 
45 10 49 
22 
(68.8) 
JO 
(31.3) 
32 
Indus-
White keeper Free trialist 
SO and 
above 
34 
(72.3) 
13 
(27.7) 
47 
Subpro - Police Collar Salesman Prof es- Busines House-
letariate Studeqt Worker Military Clerk Ani san Teacher sional Manager wife 
Early II 74 45 27 25 27 14 38 23 I 
(17.S) (21.1) (12 .7) (52 .9) (II.SJ (46.6) (11.3) (39 .6) (65 .7) (9.1) 
Late 52 277 310 24 193 31 110 58 12 IO 
(82.5) (78.9) (87.3) (47. 1) (88.5) (53.4) (88.7) (60.4) (34.3) (90.9) 
63 351 355 SI 218 58 124 96 35 II 
X' = 151.97 prob . s .00 tau b = -.085 
2L : Role in Terrorist Group 
Suppcrter Regular Leader 
Early 22 379 94 
(4.7) (23.5) (37 .3) 
Late 443 1235 158 
(95 .3) (76.5) (62.7) 
465 1614 252 
X' = 119.48 prob . :S .00 tau b = -.218 
• Percentages in parenthesis arc column percents. 
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85 
68 
153 
188 
327 
467 
1671 
2138 
285 
l077 
1362 
495 
1836 
2331 
The principal understanding to be derived from these results is that 
there occurred an expansion of terrorism to wider segments of Italian socie-
ty as the episode progressed. Instead of a repetitive process with the new 
generation(s) of terrorists simply recapitulating the institutional and social 
backgrounds of the early ones, in general, the evidence suggests that ter-
rorist groups were able to broaden, not merely deepen, their appeal the 
longer the episode continued. 
Let us be more specific. While the early terrorists were overwhelmingly 
male, the second wave contained a significant contingent of women. If we 
examine the question of where the terrorists came from by looking at their 
places of birth, compared to the first one, the second generation over-
represents people who were born in smaller communities (under 100,000) as 
well as in Rome, southern Italy and abroad. Geographically it appears as if 
the terrorists' roots descend from the northern and central parts of the 
country to the south and out from the big cities (over l million) to smaller 
towns the longer the violence persists. However, when we compare the two 
groups not by their places of birth but by their places of adult residence, 
some interesting changes occur. Here the second generation appears 
somewhat less geographically dispersed than the first. This is true especially 
of the size of the communities in which the terrorists had become resident 
prior to beginning their careers in political violence. The latecomers were 
more likely to have lived in the big cities of Rome, Turin, Genoa, Milan and 
Naples than their predecessors. It may very well be the case then that as a 
group the later terrorists were more geographically mobile, more likely to 
have been newcomers to the big cities than members of the initial wave. 
Whatever terrorist infection got transmitted from one generation to the next 
seems to have involved a passage from longer to shorter term residents of 
Italy's major metropolitan areas. 
Correlatively, the occupational backgrounds of the terrorists seem to 
exhibit a process of expansion. In general, though not without qualifica-
tion, the pattern is one of a spread from the upper strata of Italian society to 
the lower. Higher proportions of the early terrorists than the later came 
from upper status positions as business managers, industrialists and the free 
professions (law, medicine, architecture, journalism). The first group was 
also composed disproportionately of individuals with lower middle class oc-
cupational experiences as shopkeepers, salesmen and artisans as well as 
police and military officers . On the other hand, the latecomers were over-
represented among manual workers and white collar clerks, and to a lesser 
extent of subproletarians (e.g., criminals, ex-convicts, prostitutes). Students 
from universities and secondary schools make a relatively constant and 
large contribution to the terrorists' ranks. Although the level of student in-
volvement remains roughly the same in the two periods, the same cannot be 
said for their teachers. The representation of university and secondary 
school instructors increases <.ubstantially from 1977 forward. 
If we treat these data somewhat differently and regard as "intellec-
tuals" (that is people who spend a fair amount of their working time dealing 
with abstract ideas) students, teachers and free professionals, the conse-
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quence is that their contribution to terrorist activities appears both high and 
constant. What becomes variable between the two periods is the representa-
tion of individuals with backgrounds in business and labor. In the first 
period business is over-represented while in the second labor is. 
For some of the individuals in the population, the decision to become a 
terrorist seems to have been a matter of family choice. Slightly over 13 per 
cent of the terrorists were related to one another. This phenomenon was 
more prevalent among the second wave than the first, however. In this con-
nection, it is the incidence of the marital relationship that really changes 
from the first to the second periods. Although we cannot be sure, the 
greater prevalence of married couples to be found among the later 
adherents to terrorist groups may have been the consequence of husbands 
encouraging their wives to join, a particularly intimate form of contagion. 
The two segments of our population also appear to have had somewhat 
different kinds of pre-terrorist political experiences. Prior membership in a 
conventional political party was more common among early than later ter-
rorists. Conversely, the latter were more likely to have been members of the 
extraparliamentary movements. The biographical records are incomplete 
but we may at least speculate that over time terrorism spread from in-
dividuals who were more likely to have had experiences in conventional par-
ty political life to those whose involvements were more likely confined to 
the violence supportive extraparliamentary movements or to individuals 
with no reported preterrorist political experiences. 
Finally, the early and late terrorists are distinguishable on the basis of 
the roles they played once inside terrorist organizations. Here the 
prevalence of individuals identified as "supporters," those who furnished 
logistical and other forms of assistance, increased dramatically among the 
late adherents. This finding may be the result of the development of a more 
complex organizational structure articulated by terrorist groups after 1976 
as well as an increase in their recruitment of and appeal to part-timers, in-
dividuals holding regular jobs whose commitments to the terrorist enter-
prise were likely less intense than persons identified as "regulars" or 
"leaders" in the newspaper accounts and court records. 
At this stage of the analysis the evidence points to an understanding of 
Italian terrorism that emphasizes its diffusion to progressively broader 
segments of the population . There appear to have been changes of various 
kinds in the geographic, institutional and social settings from which the ter-
rorists emerged. But to what extent were these changes simply an artifact of 
the differential representation of leftist and neo-Fascist terrorists in the two 
periods with which we are concerned? As may be seen by looking at Table 3, 
a majority of pre-1977 terrorists were neo-Fascists while the great 
preponderance of the later adherents were leftists. It may very well be that 
the early/late distinctions we have observed were more a product of the dif-
ferent political composition of the two groups than they were the time 
periods during which these individuals engaged in terrorist activities. 
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Righi 
Lef l 
N = 2335 
TABL E 3 
DisLribution of Terrorists by 
Period and Political Ori en1a1ion 
Early Lale 
293 279 
206 1557 
499 1836 
572 
1763 
2335 
In order to determine whether or not this is the case we partitioned our 
population into the following four categories: early right, late right, early 
left and late left. The relevant questions then became: Were the early neo-
Fascists different from the late ones? And, were there any ways in which the 
early leftists differed from their political successors? 
In attempting to answer the first question let us begin with the negative 
findings. First, there was no significant difference among the neo-Fascists 
concerning their occupational backgrounds. In both periods they tended to 
come from the same lower middle and upper middle class sectors of Italian 
society. In addition, they tended to be drawn from the same right-wing 
political milieu. There were few neo-Fascists in either period who drifted in-
to terrorism after previous experiences with political parties at the center or 
left or in the extraparliamentary left movements. On the other hand, there 
were considerably fewer late neo-Fascists who were reported to have had 
either right-wing or extraparliamentary involvements before their ties to the 
terrorist groups developed. Lastly, the late neo-Fascists were no more or 
less likely to have been related to one another than the first collection. 
If we focus on those variables (see Table 4) that exhibit differences be-
tween early and late neo-Fascists, the case for a process of expansion 
becomes far more ambiguous than it does for the general terrorist popula-
tion. It is true that the later neo-Fascists were substantially younger than the 
earlier group. The representation of women increases, although it is never 
very high among the neo-Fascists. Also, the proportion of "supporters" 
relative to "regulars" and "leaders" grows in the second wave. Yet when 
we look at their places of birth and adult residence, the case for the diffu-
sion of neo-Fascist terrorism by expansion weakens. Measured both in 
terms of where they were born and resided the early neo-Fascists were a 
more geographically dispersed collection of people than the later ones. 
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Charactcristi~ 
Su 
Pia e or Birth 
(re11on) 
Place or Birth . 
(size or community) 
Place or Residence 
(re11on) 
Place of Residence 
(size or commu nity) 
Role in Organization 
TABLE 4 
Differences Between Early (1970-1976) and 
Late (1977-1984) co-Fascist Terrorists 
Early 10 Late Chan,e 
late more female 
x' 9.82. I df , p s .002, phi • . 138 
late younaer 
x' • 91.92, 7 dr , p s .001. 'b • ·. 363 
late more Rome 
less North and Center 
x' - 108. 19, 4 dr , p s .001,, • .471 
late more bi& city 
lcs small town and 
medium.sized cities 
x' • 30.83, 3 dr, p s .01, ' b • .25 1 
late more Rome 
less North and Center 
x• • 218.76, 4 dr, p s .00 1, , • .618 
late more big city 
less small town and 
medium•sizcd cily 
x' • 81.53, 3 dr, p s .00 1, , • .344 
late more supporters 
less regulars and leaders 
x' • 132.20, 2 dr, p s .00 1, ' b • •.438 
After the mid-1970's the neo-Fascists were a waning force. Their 
leaders' plans to stimulate a coup d'etat against the Italian regime, with the 
collaboration of well-wishers in the police and military establishments, had 
been uncovered and defeated.' The number of terrorist events for which 
they were responsible declined. In a sense our findings reflect this decline. 
Geographically we witness a contraction or concentration rather than a dif-
fusion of neo-Fascist terrorism between the two time periods. As a group 
the late neo-Fascists are more urbanized and Rome-centered than the early 
ones. However, when we consider the matter from a social or inter-personal 
perspective, there is some evidence of spread, if not in terms of occupa-
tional background then at least as reflected by their ages, gender and level 
of involvement in their respective terrorist organizations. 
While neo-Fascist terrorism may have been waning in the second 
period, left-wing terrorism was expanding. As measured by the number of 
violent events and in the number of adherents included in our population, 
terrorism from the left experienced considerable growth. Logically then we 
might expect this growth to be reflected in a wider diffusion process than 
was true for the neo-Fascists. 
In some respects (see Table 5) the ways in which the growth of left-wing 
terrorism manifested itself in the changing characteristics of the terrorists 
was not very different than the early to late changes in the makeup of the 
declining neo-Fascist formations. As with the latter, the second 
generation(s) of leftists was younger than the first. It was also more heavily 
composed of "supporters." In addition, the proportion of adherents iden-
tified as playing leadership roles in the groups declined compared to the 
"regulars" and "supporters." Also, a smaller percentage of the late than 
the early leftists were reported to have had prior memberships in political 
parties. 
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Characteristic 
A ge 
Place of Residence 
(region) 
Nature of Family 
Rela1ionsbip 
Occupation 
Previous Political 
Experience 
Rote in Organization 
TA BLE 5 
Differences Be1ween Early (I 970-76) and 
Lare (1977-84) Left -Wing Tcrr orislS 
Early 10 Lare Change 
late younger 
x' = 218,15, 10 df, p s .001, ' b = -.218 
late more Center and Rome 
less South 
x' = 15.61, 4 df , p s .004, ,, = 0.0 
late more marital 
x' = 8.94, 3 df , p s .03, ' b = .058 
late more workers. clerks, 
teachers 
less students, free pro-
fessionals and 
subproletarians 
x' = 25.04, 8 df , p s .003, ' b = .023 
late more extrapar-
liamcntary movement 
less political party 
membership 
x' = 14.23, I df , p s .001, ' b = -.251 
late more supporters 
x' = 30.57, 2 df, p s .001, ' b = -. 127 
There were some ways in which the changes among leftists were unlike 
those exhibited by the neo-Fascists. The occupational backgrounds of the 
leftists are significantly different. Here there are noticeable declines in the 
proportions of terrorists identified as free professionals and subproletarians 
as well as a more modest decline in the representation of students. The pro-
portions of manual workers, white collar clerks and teachers increases. The 
effect of these changes though is hardly like that of the overall terrorist 
population shown earlier. While it is true that the second period leftist 
organizations were more successful in recruiting manual workers than the 
first, the relatively clear pattern of terrorism spreading from high to low 
status in the Italian occupational structure now becomes unclear. This pat-
tern now seems to have been more a product of the different mixes of neo-
Fascists and leftists found in the two periods. The neo-Fascists, early and 
late, tended to come from higher status backgrounds than the leftists taken 
as a whole. 
When we consider the issue from a geographic perspective, we are 
unable to discern any significant changes in the locations in which the left-
ists were born. Late leftists were no more or less likely to have been born in 
the South or smaller communities, for example, than their predecessors. 
There is, however, a noticeable early-to-late shift in their places of 
residence, with the second generation more likely to be found in the central 
regions and Rome. The representation of terrorists from the heavily in-
dustrialized northern regions remains very high over both periods. The case 
for a diffusion of terrorism by expansion is attenuated by the fact that there 
are proportionately fewer residents of the South among the late leftists and 
there are no significant differences between the two groups related to the 
size of the communities in which they were resident. 
So far as the terrorists' gender is concerned, somewhat surprisingly the 
late leftists did not show a statistically significant increase in female 
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representation as against the early contingent. There is a shift, however, in 
the kinds of women who appear during the second period. The data suggest 
an increase in the proportion of married women who participated in the 
left-wing groups. Furthermore, second generation women were more likely 
to play leadership roles in these groups than were women who joined the 
earlier formations. 8 
IV 
It is apparent now that some of the diffusion effects we reported earlier 
in the analysis were the result of the differing mixes of neo-Fascists and left-
wing revolutionaries present in the two periods of Italy's terrorist episode. 
The ideologies seem to attract rather different kinds of people to terrorism. 
Yet there were some differences that were sustained despite the political 
distinction . If we are willing to conceive the diffusion of terrorism as the 
result of (1) expansion, its spread to progressively wider segments of the 
population, and (2) contagion, the spread of the infection more deeply 
within the same population segments, our findings may be summarized in 
the following Table 6. 
Expansion for Left and Right 
age, prior political experi-
ence, place of residence (Rome) 
and role in organization 
Expansion for Right Only 
sex (more female, place of 
birth (region and size of 
co mmunity), place of residence 
(size of com munity) 
Contagion for Left Only 
sex, place of birth (region 
and size of co mmunity) 
TABLE 6 
The Diffusion of Terrorism 
Expansion for Left Only 
Occupation, place of 
residence (central regions) 
family relationship 
Contagion for Left and Right ± 
none 
Contagion for Right Only 
occupation 
The existence of substantively significant differences is the basis for the 
classification displayed in Table 6. If such differences were found between 
the characteristics of early and late terrorists, then these characteristics were 
noted as having spread by expansion. Some of the differences were common 
to both neo-Fascists and leftists, others were specific to one or the other. 
They were classified accordingly. If, on the other hand, no meaningful dif-
ferences were found between the characteristics·of neo-Fascist and leftist 
terrorists active in the two periods, the diffusion was conceived to be the 
product of a contagion effect, with the early terrorists infecting the late. 
The classification reflects this concept as well. 
There were several characteristics of the terrorist population which 
spread through expansion between the two periods and were common to 
rightists and leftists alike. Over time the terrorists tended to become 
younger, less politically .experienced and more marginaliy committed to the 
groups with which they were affiliated . They were also more likely to be 
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residents of Rome the longer the episode continued. All the other 
characteristics classified as either expansion or contagion related were ones 
distinct to the neo-Fascists or the leftist revolutionaries. And since those dif-
ferences were discussed earlier, we will not repeat them here. 
The findings lead us to conclude that terrorism in Italy spread as the 
result of both expansion and contagion. In the absence of interviews with a 
sample of individuals included in the terrorist population, we cannot specify 
precisely how these components worked in the process of terrorist recruit-
ment. We can, of course, engage in speculation. 
One thought that comes to mind is that Italy went through a new crisis 
in 1976-77, one separable from that of 1968-69. While the latter was of an 
institutional or generational nature, the former involved problems that had 
to do with high rates of unemployment and inflation. And as in the first 
crisis so too in the second, there was a substantial amount of mass street 
agitation accompanied by accusations of governmental and party political 
ineptitude. It is conceivable that younger and less politically involved 
segments of the population largely unaffected by the first crisis were en-
gaged by the second. Aware of terrorism as part of the repertoire of tech-
niques available for the expression of political grievances, an awareness de-
rived from the 1969-76 period, they became susceptable to its use. 
We might also speculate that terrorism spread by contagion was the 
result of exposure to the same social and institutional stimuli, the same liv-
ing and working environments from which the early terrorists had already 
been recruited. The FIAT Mirafiori automobile plant in Turin and the 
universities of Padua and Rome are obvious examples. Concomitantly, it 
may be the result of exposure to the same sorts of life experiences as already 
gave rise to terrorist involvements that heighten the susceptibility. This ele-
ment is probably not missing in the spread of terrorism by expansion either. 
Yet in this context our suspicion is that the role of the mass media in making 
people aware of and attracting them to terrorist activities is likely to play a 
greater role in its cultivation. 
Finally, it would be interesting to know if the characteristics we have 
detected concerning Italy's protracted terrorist experience were unique to 
that country, or if similar findings might result from investigations con-
ducted elsewhere. 
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